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abstract: Mutual policing is thought to be important in conflict
suppression at all levels of biological organization. In hymenopteran
societies (bees, ants, and wasps), multiple mating by queens favors
mutual policing of male production among workers (worker polic-
ing). However, worker policing of male production is proving to be
more widespread than predicted by relatedness patterns, occurring
in societies headed by single-mated queens in which, paradoxically,
workers are more related to the workers’ sons that they kill than the
queen’s sons that they spare. Here we develop an inclusive-fitness
model to show that a second reproductive conflict, the conflict over
sex allocation, can explain the evolution of worker policing contrary
to relatedness predictions. Among ants, and probably other social
Hymenoptera, workers kill males to favor their more related sisters.
Importantly, males are killed at the larval stage, presumably because
workers cannot determine the sex of queen-laid eggs. Sex-allocation
biasing favors worker policing because policing removes some males
(the workers’ sons) at low cost at the egg stage rather than at higher
cost at the larval stage. Our model reveals an important interaction
between two reproductive conflicts in which the presence of one
conflict (sex allocation) favors the suppression of the other (male
production by workers).
Keywords: mutual policing, worker policing, sex-allocation conflict,
reproductive conflict, social insects.
Mutual policing, where group members suppress each
other’s reproduction, is thought to have played an im-
portant role in the rise of biological complexity (Frank
1995; Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry 1995; Keller 1999).
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Multiple mating by queens in the eusocial Hymenoptera
(bees, ants, and wasps) is predicted to result in mutual
policing of reproduction among workers (worker policing;
Starr 1984; Ratnieks 1988; Crozier and Pamilo 1996). Al-
though typically unable to mate, workers in most species
can compete with the queen over male production by
laying unfertilized eggs, which are male. However, in a
colony with more than two worker patrilines (effective
paternit ), workers are more related to the queen’sy 1 2
sons (brothers; ) than to other workers’ sonsrp 0.25
(nephews; ), so worker policing is selectivelyr ! 0.25
favored.
Consistent with theoretical prediction, worker policing
by egg eating has been found in the multiple-mated hon-
eybees Apis mellifera, Apis cerana, and Apis florea (Ratnieks
and Visscher 1989; Barron et al. 2001), while in the typ-
ically single-mated stingless bees and bumblebees, worker
policing appears to be absent because workers’ sons are
reared (van Honk et al. 1981; Estoup et al. 1995; Peters
et al. 1999). In addition, evidence for worker policing has
been found in multiple- but not single-paternity colonies
of the wasp Dolichovespula saxonica (Foster and Ratnieks
2000). However, nonequal paternity in the offspring of
some multiple-mated D. saxonica queens makes effective
paternity !2, so that workers are in fact slightly more
related to nephews than brothers. Worker policing has also
been found in the European hornet Vespa crabro (effective
paternit ; Foster et al. 1999, 2002; Foster 2000)yp 1.11
and the common wasp Vespula vulgaris (effective
paternit .90; Foster and Ratnieks 2001). Further-yp 1
more, worker policing occurs in three species of queenless
ant, where, although genetic studies are required, it may
also have evolved contrary to relatedness predictions
(Gobin et al. 1999; Kikuta and Tsuji 1999; Liebig et al.
1999). In many colonies, therefore, workers are paradox-
ically causing the replacement of their more-related neph-
ews ( ) by less-related brothers.r 1 0.25
In addition to conflict over male production, queen-
worker conflict over sex allocation also occurs in hyme-
nopteran societies (Hamilton 1964; Trivers and Hare
1976). Workers typically favor a more female-biased sex
616 The American Naturalist
Figure 1: How worker policing reduces the cost of sex-allocation biasing (i.e., ; eq. [5]). Three stages are shown. A, Egg stage, during whichC ! Cp np
worker policing occurs and worker-laid eggs are targeted. B, Larval stage, during which sex-allocation biasing is performed by killing a proportion
of the male brood (the final sex ratio shown is three females to one male). C, Adult stage, during which workers reinvest the resources from the
killed male larvae into the remaining brood, but at an efficiency cost of 20%.
ratio than the queen. This is because workers are more
related to the queen’s daughters (sisters; rp 0.25
, where k is effective paternity) than the queen’s sons0.5/k
(brothers; ), while the queen is equally related torp 0.25
both sexes ( ; Hamilton 1964; Trivers and Harerp 0.5
1976). Consistent with worker-control of sex-allocation
biasing, sex allocation in most ant species is female biased
(Trivers and Hare 1976; Boomsma 1989; Pamilo 1990;
Bourke and Franks 1995). In the few species where the
mechanism of sex-allocation biasing by workers has been
investigated, biasing occurs by the killing of males. Killing
of male larvae has been demonstrated in the wood ant
Formica exsecta (Sundstro¨m et al. 1996; Chapuisat et al.
1997) and the Argentine ant Linepithema humile (Aron et
al. 1994; Passera and Aron 1996). In addition, evidence
for the removal of males between the egg and pupae stages
occurs in Formica truncorum (L. Sundstro¨m, personal
communication), the fire ant Solenopsis invicta (Aron et
al. 1995), and the ants Myrmica tahoensis (Evans 1995)
and Pheidole pallidula (Keller et al. 1996). It has been
suggested that workers remove male larvae rather than
eggs because they are unable to identify the sex of eggs
(Nonacs 1993). Evidence that workers have difficulty iden-
tifying the sex of young brood was provided by Nonacs
and Carlin (1990), who showed that workers of the Florida
carpenter ant Camponotus floridanus failed to discriminate
the sex of brood until the pupal stage.
Here we consider the effect of the queen-worker conflict
over sex allocation on the evolution of mutual policing
among workers. We model a situation in which workers
kill male larvae to bias sex allocation and examine the
conditions under which worker policing, that is, the killing
of worker-laid male eggs, is selected. We show that sex-
allocation manipulation can select for worker policing
when the queen is singly mated because policing reduces
the cost of male killing by removing some of the males at
very low cost as eggs.
The Model
Overview
We consider a situation in which workers remove excess
males to cause a female-biased sex-allocation ratio (fig. 1).
They can either start killing males at the egg stage or in
the larval stage. Consistent with the empirical data (above),
we assume that in the egg stage the only eggs that they
know to be male are those laid by workers. That is, workers
cannot recognize the gender of queen-laid eggs, but they
can recognize whether an egg is queen or worker laid. In
the larval stage, we assume that workers can recognize the
gender of larvae but not their maternal origin. The latter
is supported by Ratnieks and Visscher (1989), who showed
that honeybees accepted both workers’ and queen’s sons
in the larval stage but preferentially killed workers’ sons
at the egg stage. We assume that there is a negligible cost
in killing eggs but that larvae that are killed incur a cost
of c. That is, only of energy in males can be real-1 c
located by killing. The reinvested resources can be real-
located either to reproductives of both sexes (males and
queens, as in fig. 1) or only to females (queens).
Our model reveals a novel benefit to worker policing.
Worker Policing and Sex-Allocation Biasing 617
Table 1: Parameters and variables used in the model
Value Description
Vnp, Vp Allocation component of fitness in nonpolicing and policing colonies
g s , g b, gn Relatedness of focal worker to sisters, brothers, and nephews
v , vf m Sex-specific reproductive values of females and males
x, y Proportions of colony sex allocation to females and males
X, Y Proportions of population sex allocation to females and males
Wc Proportion of males that are workers’ sons in the colony
Wpop Proportion of males that are workers’ sons in the population
ychange Reduction in the allocation to males by male killing as a proportion of all the brood
c Proportion of the energy invested in an adult male that is lost if he is killed
Bpolicing Difference in inclusive fitness of a worker in a policing versus a nonpolicing colony
Cp, Cnp Proportional reduction in total colony productivity resulting from male killing
k Effective paternity in colonies and the population
w Proportion of eggs that are laid by workers
xq, yq Proportions of queen-laid eggs that are female and male
x1, y1 Proportions of females and males before sex-allocation biasing
x2, y2 Proportions of adult females and males after sex-allocation biasing
P Frequency of policing colonies versus nonpolicing colonies
Xopt Stable sex-allocation ratio for workers
In colonies with worker policing, the cost of sex-allocation
biasing is reduced because some males are removed at low
cost as eggs rather than at higher cost as larvae (fig. 1;
).C ! Cp np
Inclusive-Fitness Equations
The model follows Pamilo’s (1991a, 1991b) formulation
of inclusive fitness and compares the “allocation com-
ponent of fitness” (V ) of a nonlaying worker in a colony
with worker policing to a nonlaying worker in a colony
without worker policing. All parameters used in the model
are shown in table 1. The allocation component of fitness
is the sum of the fitness gained from each class of offspring
or relative. With worker reproduction, there are three
classes of reproductive relatives of the focal nonlaying
worker: queen’s daughters (the focal worker’s sisters),
queen’s sons (the focal worker’s brothers), and workers’
sons (the focal worker’s nephews), so that
g v x (1W )g v y W g v ys c b c nf m mVp   ,
X Y Y
or
g v x [(1W )g W g ]v ys c b c nf mVp  , (1)
X Y
where and are the sex-specific reproductive values ofv vf m
females and males, x and y are the proportional allocations
to each sex in the focal colony, X and Y are the proportional
allocations to each sex in the whole population, Wc is the
proportion of males in the colony that are workers’ sons,
and gs, gb, and gn are the regression relatednesses of sisters,
brothers, and nephews to the focal worker. Worker polic-
ing will be selected if the inclusive fitness of the focal
worker in a policing colony is greater than that of a focal
worker in a nonpolicing colony.
First, we calculate the allocation component of fitness
for a focal worker in nonpolicing ( ) and policing ( )V Vnp p
colonies :
V p g v  [(1W )g W g ]v , (2)np s c b c nf m
V p g v  g v . (3)p s bf m
We assume that all colonies in the population have the
same sex-allocation ratio, so that and inxp X yp Y
equations (2) and (3), which cancels equation (1). (We
discuss the effect of relaxing this assumption below.) Next,
we incorporate an efficiency cost of sex allocation (C):
Cp y c, (4)change
where c is the inefficiency of energy transfer between the
killed larval males and the colony and ychange is the change
in the proportional allocation to males (change in male
allocation as a proportion of all the brood). We can now
compare the inclusive fitness of nonlaying workers in po-
licing versus nonpolicing colonies (Bpolicing):
B p (1 C )V  (1 C )V , (5)policing p p np np
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Figure 2: The proportion of males that are workers’ sons if the workers
lay a proportion w of the total eggs, x q of the queen’s eggs are female,
and are male (Wc; eq. [7a]).y p 1 xq q
where Cp and Cnp are the costs of sex allocation in policing
and nonpolicing colonies, and, conversely, and1 Cp
are the relative productivity of each colony type.1 Cnp
Worker policing is selected when Bpolicing is positive.
Model Parameters
We now have an equation that calculates the fitness effect
of worker policing in colonies where sex-allocation biasing
occurs. We are interested in the effect of six key factors
on Bpolicing, which need to be incorporated into equations
(2)–(5): k (effective paternity; the basis of the original
worker policing predictions; Ratnieks 1988), c (cost of re-
cycling male larvae), w (amount of worker laying, as this
varies greatly between species; Bourke and Franks 1995),
xq (primary sex ratio of queen-laid eggs—the proportion
of eggs that are female), x 2 (final allocation to females,
after workers have performed sex-allocation biasing), and
P (proportion of policing colonies in the population). We
now define the values in equations (2)–(5) in terms of
these factors.
Regression relatedness (Hamilton 1970; Grafen 1985). We
base the model on single-queen societies because colony
kin structure can be defined in terms of a single variable,
“effective paternity,” itself determined by queen mating
frequency and sperm use (Boomsma and Ratnieks 1996).
However, the method is also applicable to multiple-queen
societies where relatedness patterns that favor policing or
disfavor policing also occur dependent on the number and
relatedness of queens (Pamilo 1991b):
g p 0.25 0.5(1/k), (6a)s
g p 0.5, (6b)b
g p 0.25 0.5(1/k). (6c)n
The proportion of males in the population that are work-
ers’ sons (Wpop). This is dependent on two factors: the
proportion of males that are workers’ sons in the non-
policing colonies Wc (fig. 2),
w
W pc w (1 w)yq
w
p , (7a)
w (1 w)(1 x )q
and the frequency of policing colonies (P), for which we
assume that no workers’ sons are reared, versus nonpol-
icing colonies ( ),1 P
W p (1 P)W . (7b)pop c
Reproductive value (Fisher 1930). When all males in the
population are queen’s sons, females have twice the re-
productive value of males because males contribute only
genes to females of the next generation. With worker re-
production, however, father males also contribute genes
to males, thereby raising male reproductive value (see
Bourke and Franks 1995 and Crozier and Pamilo 1996 for
a summary of reproductive value and relatedness):
v p 1, (8a)f
1
v p . (8b)m 2Wpop
The amount of male killing needed to change the primary
sex ratio to the sex ratio after sex-allocation biasing (ychange;
eq. [4]). The primary sex allocation to females (fig. 2) is
x p (1 w)x , (9)1 q
where in policing colonies. We consider the twowp 0
extreme cases of male reinvestment into reproductives of
both sexes or only into queens: first, if resources are re-
invested into reproductives of both sexes (fig. 3A)
(y  y ) y1 change 2p ,
x x1 2
x1y p 1 , (10a)change x 2
and, second, if resources are reinvested only into queens
(fig. 3B),
y  y y1 change 2p ,
x  (1 c)y x1 change 2
x  x2 1y p . (10b)change 1 cx  c2
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Figure 3: Calculation of ychange, the number of males that must be killed
to produce a given secondary sex-allocation ratio. Values x1 and y1 are
the proportions of females and males before, and x 2 and y2 after, sex-
allocation biasing. A, Sex allocation with reinvestment back into the
colony as a whole (eq. [10a]). B, Sex allocation with reinvestment back
into females (eq. [10b]). Reinvestment of a proportion ychange of the males
results in the production of new brood (females and males(1 c)ychange
in A and females only in B) and a waste of ychangec.
The stable sex-allocation ratio for workers (Xopt). The sta-
ble sex-allocation ratio for workers is determined by the
relative kin value of males versus females (Fisher 1930;
Trivers and Hare 1976; Benford 1978; Pamilo 1991a):
g f vf• •X p . (11)opt g f vf [v (1W )g W g ]• pop b pop nm
Results
The equations were combined, and Bpolicing was evaluated
using Mathematica 3.0 (Wolfram Research 1996; fig. 4).
Our aim was to determine the effect of the cost of sex-
allocation biasing c on the paternity frequency at which
worker policing is selected (when ) and to seeB 1 0policing
how robust the results are with respect to parameters w,
x 2, xq, and P. Unless otherwise stated, the results are for
(10% of the investment in a male that is killedcp 0.1
cannot be recovered), (half of all eggs are laid bywp 0.5
workers), (the queen lays eggs at an equal sexx p 0.5q
ratio), (colony and population sex allocation isx p X2 opt
at the worker optimum), (worker policing is in-Pp 0
vading), and ychange is for killed male larvae reinvested into
both females and males.
Cost of Sex-Allocation Biasing (Fig. 4A)
Introducing an efficiency cost of 10% or 20% to the re-
cycling of males killed during sex allocation has a large
effect on the threshold at which worker policing is favored.
An efficiency cost of 123% results in policing being favored
at all paternities. With no efficiency cost, the classic result
that worker policing is selected when effective paternity is
12 (Starr 1984; Ratnieks 1988) is recovered.
Reinvestment Directly into Females (Fig. 4B)
If killed males are reinvested directly into new queens, the
benefit of worker policing is reduced. That is, for a given
efficiency cost (c), the paternity at which worker policing
is favored is higher than in figure 4A. This is expected
because reinvestment directly into queens makes sex-
allocation biasing by male larvae killing more efficient,
thereby reducing the benefit of worker policing.
The Amount of Worker Laying (Fig. 4C)
Worker policing is favored by increased worker egg laying.
This is because more worker-laid eggs results in more male
larvae to kill, which raises the cost of sex-allocation biasing
in nonpolicing colonies. Importantly, worker policing is
always selected for at paternities !2 at all levels of worker
reproduction. This is logical because worker policing of
eggs can only reduce the cost of killing male larvae.
The Proportion of Females Raised
by the Workers (Fig. 4D)
The final sex-allocation ratio slightly affects the paternity
frequency at which policing is favored. The more female
biased the final sex-allocation ratio (closer to the worker
optimum), the more difficult it is for worker policing to
evolve. This is because a female bias requires more male
killing in both policing and nonpolicing colonies, which
decreases the difference in the amount of male larvae kill-
ing in nonpolicing versus policing colonies. That is,
is slightly reduced (see fig. 1), which reduces theC  Cnp p
relative benefit of worker policing.
The Proportion of Female Eggs Laid
by the Queen (Fig. 4E)
Figure 4E shows that if the queen lays a male-biased sex
ratio, the benefit of worker policing is reduced. As with a
female-biased final sex ratio (fig. 4D), a male-biased pri-
mary sex ratio causes more killing of male larvae in both
policing and nonpolicing colonies, thereby decreasing the
difference between the two colony types.
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Figure 4: A, Effect of an efficiency cost of male killing, c, on the paternity frequency at which worker policing is selected. Positive values of Bpolicing
indicate a benefit to nonlaying workers from worker policing. With no cost ( ), the classic worker-policing result that workers will police atcp 0
effective paternity 12 is recovered (Ratnieks 1988). B, Resources reinvested directly into new queens. C, Effect of the amount of worker laying. D,
Effect of the final sex-allocation ratio. E, Effect of the queen-laid sex ratio. F, Effect of the frequency of colonies with worker policing in the
population. Unless otherwise stated, killed males are reinvested into both sexes; , , , , and .cp 0.1 wp 0.5 x p X x p 0.5 Pp 02 opt q
The Frequency of Worker Policing
in the Population (Fig. 4F)
The frequency of policing colonies in the population has
little effect on the paternity at which policing is selected.
There is, however, a difference in the gradient of the curves
in figure 4F. This is because worker policing ( ) re-P 1 0
duces male production by workers, which lowers the re-
productive value of males (eq. [8]). This reduces the al-
location component of fitness of workers (V; eq. [1]) in
all colonies and decreases the magnitude of Bpolicing at all
paternities.
Discussion
The results show that worker policing can be selected at
low paternity when worker sex-allocation biasing by the
killing of male larvae occurs. That is, worker policing is
favored even when workers are more related to other work-
ers’ sons than to the queen’s sons. Worker policing is
favored because it reduces the cost of sex-allocation biasing
by removing males at low cost in the egg stage. This con-
clusion is robust whether reinvestment of killed males is
into both sexes or into young queens alone, for any
amount of worker laying, at both the queen and worker
sex-allocation optima, when policing is either rare or com-
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mon, and for all but extremely male-biased primary sex
ratios of queen-laid eggs ( ; fig. 4).x ! 0.1q
Our model does not consider costs to either worker
reproduction or worker policing. If worker reproduction
reduces colony productivity, this will also favor the evo-
lution of policing, and, like the effect shown in our model,
this can also cause policing to evolve at low paternity
(Ratnieks 1988). A cost to worker policing itself, con-
versely, will disfavor its evolution. However, such costs do
not affect our prediction that sex-allocation biasing facil-
itates the evolution of worker policing, except in the ex-
treme case that worker policing is more costly than male
larvae killing. This is highly unlikely given that much more
energy will be lost from killing larvae than eggs, while
other costs, such as searching the brood, are likely to be
comparable.
The paternity frequency at which policing is favored is
critically dependent on the amount of investment into
males that can be recovered by killing. For our parameter
values, a loss of 123% results in worker policing being
favored at all paternities, that is, irrespective of relatedness
to males. The amount of energy lost through male killing
is dependent on four key factors: first, metabolic efficiency,
which is the percentage of energy consumed that is in-
corporated into new biomass; second, the amount of en-
ergy in males at the time of their execution, with less
energy lost the earlier that males are killed; third, the labor
cost of rearing males, which is permanently lost; and,
fourth, accuracy of worker recognition of the sex of larvae.
If workers sometimes mistakenly kill females during sex-
allocation biasing, the cost of sex-allocation biasing will
increase. The importance of the third and fourth factors
are unknown. However, given that metabolic efficiency in
carnivorous insects is around 45% (Begon et al. 1990;
Chapuisat et al. 1997) and male killing sometimes occurs
late in the larval stage (Chapuisat et al. 1997), a loss greater
than 20% seems realistic and is probably an underestimate.
Extension of the theory of worker policing was inspired
by the Vespinae wasps, whose worker policing by egg eating
occurs at paternities !2 (Foster 2000; Foster and Ratnieks
2000, 2001) and with whom female-biased sex allocation
occurs (Edwards 1980; Archer 1998). However, with fe-
male-biased sex allocation common in eusocial Hyme-
noptera (Pamilo 1990), the potential for this interaction
between worker sex-allocation biasing and policing is
widespread.
Our model assumes that all colonies have the same sex
allocation. This is not always true. When colonies in the
same population vary in paternity, it is predicted that
workers in low-paternity colonies benefit from specializing
in females, while workers in higher-paternity colonies ben-
efit by investing in males, which results in split sex ratios
(Boomsma and Grafen 1990, 1991; Ratnieks 1991). This
pattern has been found in several species (Queller and
Strassmann 1998), including the ants Formica truncorum
(Sundstro¨m 1994a, 1994b) and Formica exsecta (Sund-
stro¨m et al. 1996) and the wasp Dolichovespula arenaria
(F. L. W. Ratnieks and J. J. Boomsma, unpublished data).
Facultative sex-allocation biasing also occurs when colo-
nies vary in the number of queens in the ants Myrmica
tahoensis (Evans 1995) and Leptothorax acervorum (Chan
and Bourke 1994) and five epiponine wasp species (Queller
et al. 1993; Hastings et al. 1998), which is in line with
relatedness predictions.
The effect of facultative sex-allocation biasing on our
predictions is best understood by considering the two types
of colony, low paternity and high paternity, separately. In
the low-paternity colonies, workers kill male larvae to bias
allocation to females. As in our model, this will select for
worker policing even though relatedness does not predict
it. Because paternity is so low in these colonies, however,
a relatively high cost to male killing is required for worker
policing to evolve ( for single paternity with ourc 1 0.23
parameter values; fig. 4A). Workers in high-paternity col-
onies favor male-biased sex allocation, which means that
less and maybe no male killing occurs (depending on the
amount of worker laying w and the final allocation to
females x 2). This will reduce or remove the additional
benefit to worker policing predicted by our model. How-
ever, the high paternity in these colonies increases the
likelihood of worker policing due to relatedness patterns
alone (Ratnieks 1988; Foster and Ratnieks 2000). Overall,
facultative sex-allocation biasing will also favor the evo-
lution of worker policing. With a high cost to male killing
required in low-paternity colonies and possibly no male
killing in high-paternity colonies, however, the conditions
where policing will evolve are likely to be more restrictive,
or at least more specific, than in our model.
This study shows the value of considering reproductive
conflicts simultaneously as actually occurs in nature rather
than one at a time. Our model reveals a condition under
which sex allocation and male production cannot be
treated separately. This study also shows the importance
of considering specific details of reproductive biology, such
as the timing of male killing, which is itself caused by
limitations in the ability of workers to recognize the gender
of brood (otherwise they would kill the queen’s male eggs).
Although general inclusive-fitness models are very im-
portant (Hamilton 1964), the theory should be applied
with care and must often be combined with specific knowl-
edge of the study species and the constraints on the rec-
ognition mechanisms needed to manipulate reproduction
(Keller 1997).
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